Presented by FFA National Coach Education Manager, Kelly Cross
Kelly has put together two presentations based on his observations at the recent FIFA U-20 World Cup in Canada where he was a member of the FIFA Technical Study Group.
Topics covered:
• Comparison of defending styles
• Detailed analysis of champions Argentina
Who should attend?
The session is open to all but the tactical content is of special interest to those involved in senior and elite youth coaching.
Date
Wednesday, 12 December 2007
Venue
Griffith University, QLD
Nathan Campus, Building N18,
Central Theatres Sister Theatre
(see map on next page)
Time
6:45pm for 7:00pm start
Entry
Free
RSVP
by 6 December
Contact Teneille on (07) 3420 5866 or teneille@footballqueensland.com.au
Places are limited!
All attendees will receive the presentations on CD.
For more information about Coaching in Australia visit
http://www.footballaustralia.com.au/coaching
http://www.footballaustralia.com.au/sit ... source.pdf
Coaching Seminar - FIFA U-20 World Cup Technical Observation
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Playing systems and tactics
The FIFA U-20 World Cup Canada 2007 showed that a number of systems and formations can work if teams have the right players. Argentina, for example, used a fl exible 4-4-2 set-up with one full-back operating in a slightly more advanced role.
The Czech Republic, meanwhile, employed a 4-5-1 formation, their two wingers coming inside to help form the team’s fi rst line of defence or to provide cover for the advancing full-backs.
Chile’s 3-5-2 formation was very fl exible. When their opponents were in possession, the Chilean wingers dropped back to form a back fi ve. Austria, however, alternated between 4-5-1 and 4-4-2 depending on the state of play and the opposition.
Both Chile and Argentina always used two strikers who rotated to create more space for advancing team-mates. The Czechs, however, played with one striker and two attacking midfi elders. Austria were more successful whenever they started with one striker and introduced a second during the course of a match.
Most teams (21 out of 24) played with a back four operating on a zonal-marking basis. Depending on the state of play, some teams (such as Gambia for example) asked their central defenders to manmark the opponent in their area of the pitch. Three teams – Mexico, Chile and Korea Republic – used a three-man defence with the central defender sometimes operating from a slightly withdrawn position.
Argentina and Brazil both preferred to mark opponents wherever they were, rather than simply mark dangerous space. Further up the pitch, there were three-, four- and five-man midfi eld units on show. With the threeman set-up, as favoured by Portugal and Uruguay, one player played in front of the defence with support from two men in the channels on either side. There were two main types of four-man midfield units. In the fi rst system, which was used by Austria, Brazil and Spain among others, two defensive midfi elders played in front of the defence with two players out wide. The second variation, as used by Argentina, Gambia, Japan and Nigeria, was a “diamond†formation in which a defensive
midfi elder played in front of the back four, with two midfi elders ahead and slightly to either side of him and the fourth midfi elder playing directly
behind the strikers. The teams that used a fiveman midfi eld employed one of two systems: two defensive midfi elders with two players ahead and to the side and one player behind the solitary striker (e.g. Korea Republic and Poland), or two defensive midfi elders behind a three-man midfi eld unit (e.g. Chile, Mexico, the Czech Republic and the USA).
The teams that fielded three strikers, such as Portugal and Uruguay for example, also used two wingers who dropped back into midfi eld when
the opposition had the ball in order to defend and create a 4-5-1 formation. Teams playing with two strikers asked their midfi elders to push up to provide support. When teams played with one man up front, the lone striker played high up the pitch in order to receive passes from deep and to give midfi elders space to drive forward (e.g. Austria, Congo, Poland, USA).
There were also a number of teams, such as Austria, who could switch from one striker to two whenever necessary. Many teams, however, were unable to adapt their formation during the course of a match. Only a few teams (e.g. Austria, Czech Republic, Nigeria) were capable of changing their tactics by making substitutions.
Rapid transition from attack to defence
Canada 2007 once again proved the value of being able to switch quickly from attack to defence and vice versa. When on the attack, teams tended to allow for the possibility of losing possession by making sure that they had enough men at the back to repel quick counter-attacks. Austria, Chile, Spain and the USA all used this form of structured attack. Five or six players stayed back to form a secure defensive unit that was bolstered by the attackers, who would rapidly retreat whenever possession was lost. Depending on tactics or the state of play in the match, teams would either apply immediate pressure to try to regain possession or attempt to break down attacks by outnumbering opponents in central midfi eld or defence.
Argentina‘s man-to-man approach led to effective pressing. This was especially true in their own half, but they would also push players up to
press in the opposition‘s half. Nevertheless, teams often failed to drop back after set pieces, which allowed their opponents to launch dangerous counter-attacks.
Some teams could be described as “specialist counter-attacking teams†because once they were in possession, they either played long balls towards their strikers (e.g. Austria, Czech Republic, Japan, Nigeria and Poland), dribbled at speed and rapidly passed the ball through midfi eld or down the wings (e.g. Brazil, Korea Republic, USA), or knocked accurate balls into space (e.g. Argentina, Chile, Spain). A total of 24 goals were scored on the counter-attack or in breakaways after teams had thwarted opponents’ attacks before they could develop.
Playmaker in defensive midfield
The 2006 FIFA World Cupâ„¢ in Germany showed that playmakers now tend to operate from a position in defensive midfi eld, and this was confirmed at the U-20 World Cup in Canada.
Modern football leaves precious little space in the attacking third and the farther a player advances up the pitch, the less time he has on the ball.
Playmakers can therefore benefi t from playing in a more withdrawn position as they can pull the strings from deep positions and use their vision and creativity to dictate their team’s game and rhythm. Depending on the state of play and the space available, they then either try to finish moves themselves or play the fi nal, decisive ball that can lead to a goal.
Canada 2007 also saw a number of teams that had two players – one attack-minded and one more defensive player – who could switch positions depending on the state of play. The most outstanding playmakers in defensive midfield were Banega (Argentina, who actually operated from a slightly more attacking position), Bradley (USA), Isla (Chile), Juarez (Mexico), Kavlak (Austria), Olufemi (Nigeria), Such (Czech Republic), Javi Garcia (Spain) and Cardaccio (Uruguay).
Outstanding players
In the modern game, there is often so little to choose between teams that small details can be the difference between victory and defeat. It is therefore little surprise that outstanding individual players are so important to a team because their extraordinary skills mean they can determine the outcome of a game.
The term “outstanding individual player†is mostly used to refer to attacking players whose goals can decide matches. The FIFA U-20 World Cup in Canada, however, showed that extraordinary players also play in defence. While players such as Aguero and Moralez (both Argentina), Vidangossy (Chile), Dos Santos (Mexico) and Freddy Adu (USA) naturally claimed their share of the limelight, other standouts – to name but a
few – included Chile’s goalkeeper Toselli, central defenders Cahais Argentina) and Pique (Spain), and midfi elders Banega (Argentina), Cardaccio (Uruguay) and Bradley (USA). Toselli made a string of crucial saves in the play-off for third place to ensure that his team came out on top. Cahais and Pique commanded their team’s defence, whereas Banega, Cardaccio and Bradley were midfi eld dynamos in both defence and attack.
Playing systems and tactics
The FIFA U-20 World Cup Canada 2007 showed that a number of systems and formations can work if teams have the right players. Argentina, for example, used a fl exible 4-4-2 set-up with one full-back operating in a slightly more advanced role.
The Czech Republic, meanwhile, employed a 4-5-1 formation, their two wingers coming inside to help form the team’s fi rst line of defence or to provide cover for the advancing full-backs.
Chile’s 3-5-2 formation was very fl exible. When their opponents were in possession, the Chilean wingers dropped back to form a back fi ve. Austria, however, alternated between 4-5-1 and 4-4-2 depending on the state of play and the opposition.
Both Chile and Argentina always used two strikers who rotated to create more space for advancing team-mates. The Czechs, however, played with one striker and two attacking midfi elders. Austria were more successful whenever they started with one striker and introduced a second during the course of a match.
Most teams (21 out of 24) played with a back four operating on a zonal-marking basis. Depending on the state of play, some teams (such as Gambia for example) asked their central defenders to manmark the opponent in their area of the pitch. Three teams – Mexico, Chile and Korea Republic – used a three-man defence with the central defender sometimes operating from a slightly withdrawn position.
Argentina and Brazil both preferred to mark opponents wherever they were, rather than simply mark dangerous space. Further up the pitch, there were three-, four- and five-man midfi eld units on show. With the threeman set-up, as favoured by Portugal and Uruguay, one player played in front of the defence with support from two men in the channels on either side. There were two main types of four-man midfield units. In the fi rst system, which was used by Austria, Brazil and Spain among others, two defensive midfi elders played in front of the defence with two players out wide. The second variation, as used by Argentina, Gambia, Japan and Nigeria, was a “diamond†formation in which a defensive
midfi elder played in front of the back four, with two midfi elders ahead and slightly to either side of him and the fourth midfi elder playing directly
behind the strikers. The teams that used a fiveman midfi eld employed one of two systems: two defensive midfi elders with two players ahead and to the side and one player behind the solitary striker (e.g. Korea Republic and Poland), or two defensive midfi elders behind a three-man midfi eld unit (e.g. Chile, Mexico, the Czech Republic and the USA).
The teams that fielded three strikers, such as Portugal and Uruguay for example, also used two wingers who dropped back into midfi eld when
the opposition had the ball in order to defend and create a 4-5-1 formation. Teams playing with two strikers asked their midfi elders to push up to provide support. When teams played with one man up front, the lone striker played high up the pitch in order to receive passes from deep and to give midfi elders space to drive forward (e.g. Austria, Congo, Poland, USA).
There were also a number of teams, such as Austria, who could switch from one striker to two whenever necessary. Many teams, however, were unable to adapt their formation during the course of a match. Only a few teams (e.g. Austria, Czech Republic, Nigeria) were capable of changing their tactics by making substitutions.
Rapid transition from attack to defence
Canada 2007 once again proved the value of being able to switch quickly from attack to defence and vice versa. When on the attack, teams tended to allow for the possibility of losing possession by making sure that they had enough men at the back to repel quick counter-attacks. Austria, Chile, Spain and the USA all used this form of structured attack. Five or six players stayed back to form a secure defensive unit that was bolstered by the attackers, who would rapidly retreat whenever possession was lost. Depending on tactics or the state of play in the match, teams would either apply immediate pressure to try to regain possession or attempt to break down attacks by outnumbering opponents in central midfi eld or defence.
Argentina‘s man-to-man approach led to effective pressing. This was especially true in their own half, but they would also push players up to
press in the opposition‘s half. Nevertheless, teams often failed to drop back after set pieces, which allowed their opponents to launch dangerous counter-attacks.
Some teams could be described as “specialist counter-attacking teams†because once they were in possession, they either played long balls towards their strikers (e.g. Austria, Czech Republic, Japan, Nigeria and Poland), dribbled at speed and rapidly passed the ball through midfi eld or down the wings (e.g. Brazil, Korea Republic, USA), or knocked accurate balls into space (e.g. Argentina, Chile, Spain). A total of 24 goals were scored on the counter-attack or in breakaways after teams had thwarted opponents’ attacks before they could develop.
Playmaker in defensive midfield
The 2006 FIFA World Cupâ„¢ in Germany showed that playmakers now tend to operate from a position in defensive midfi eld, and this was confirmed at the U-20 World Cup in Canada.
Modern football leaves precious little space in the attacking third and the farther a player advances up the pitch, the less time he has on the ball.
Playmakers can therefore benefi t from playing in a more withdrawn position as they can pull the strings from deep positions and use their vision and creativity to dictate their team’s game and rhythm. Depending on the state of play and the space available, they then either try to finish moves themselves or play the fi nal, decisive ball that can lead to a goal.
Canada 2007 also saw a number of teams that had two players – one attack-minded and one more defensive player – who could switch positions depending on the state of play. The most outstanding playmakers in defensive midfield were Banega (Argentina, who actually operated from a slightly more attacking position), Bradley (USA), Isla (Chile), Juarez (Mexico), Kavlak (Austria), Olufemi (Nigeria), Such (Czech Republic), Javi Garcia (Spain) and Cardaccio (Uruguay).
Outstanding players
In the modern game, there is often so little to choose between teams that small details can be the difference between victory and defeat. It is therefore little surprise that outstanding individual players are so important to a team because their extraordinary skills mean they can determine the outcome of a game.
The term “outstanding individual player†is mostly used to refer to attacking players whose goals can decide matches. The FIFA U-20 World Cup in Canada, however, showed that extraordinary players also play in defence. While players such as Aguero and Moralez (both Argentina), Vidangossy (Chile), Dos Santos (Mexico) and Freddy Adu (USA) naturally claimed their share of the limelight, other standouts – to name but a
few – included Chile’s goalkeeper Toselli, central defenders Cahais Argentina) and Pique (Spain), and midfi elders Banega (Argentina), Cardaccio (Uruguay) and Bradley (USA). Toselli made a string of crucial saves in the play-off for third place to ensure that his team came out on top. Cahais and Pique commanded their team’s defence, whereas Banega, Cardaccio and Bradley were midfi eld dynamos in both defence and attack.
